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ABSTRACT
Can all the universities that claim to be “world-class” actually live up 
to the claim? If they could be, would that be desirable public policy? It 
could be that there are so many different meanings of “world-class” that 
the term in practical effect is an oxymoron: the defi nition of “world” is 
determined locally when conceptually it should be defi ned internationally. 
This paper discusses different kinds of institutional quality, how quality 
is formed and how it can be measured, particularly by comparison. It 
also discusses the subtle but fundamental differences between quality 
and reputation. The paper concludes with the suggestion that world-class 
comparisons of research quality and productivity are possible, but that any 
broader application to the  “world-class” quality of universities will be at 
best futile and at worst misleading.
RESUMÉ
Toutes les universités qui se disent de « classe mondiale » peuvent-
elles vraiment se montrer à la hauteur de cette revendication ? Si elles le 
pouvaient, est-ce que ce serait dans l’intérêt public ?  En fait, l’expression « 
classe mondiale » peut prendre tant de sens qu’il s’agit dans la pratique d’un 
oxymore : la défi nition de « mondiale » est établie à l’échelle locale alors 
qu’en fait elle devrait l’être au plan conceptuel à l’échelle internationale. 
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Cet article traite des différentes sortes de qualités caractérisant les 
établissements, de la manière dont ces qualités en viennent à exister et 
de la façon de les évaluer, particulièrement en faisant des comparaisons. 
Il analyse également les différences subtiles, mais fondamentales, entre 
qualité et réputation. En conclusion, l’article suggère qu’il est possible 
de comparer le niveau de la qualité et de l’effi cience des recherches des 
universités à l’échelle mondiale, mais qu’une application plus vaste de 
leur qualité de « classe mondiale » serait futile, voire trompeuse. 
INTRODUCTION
At the end of each installment of his popular Prairie Home Companion 
radio stories about the fi ctional American town of Lake Wobegon, Garrison 
Keillor describes the town as being a place where “all the children are 
above average.” If one were to take into account all the claims made by 
universities about being “world-class” the impression would be similar: 
they are all world-class. But, just as not all children can be above average, 
not all universities can be world-class. Even if they could be, perhaps they 
should not be.
This is more than a matter of puckish humour. It begs some important 
questions. What does “world-class” mean in higher education? Will a 
headlong rush to be world-class – whatever it might be mean – defeat 
diversity and compromise accessibility and possibly even quality? What 
are the costs and benefi ts of what amounts to “look alike competition” 
which instead of stimulating innovation encourages conformity? 
Who should be the arbiter of eligibility for membership in the club of 
world-class universities? Although the question may seen counter-intuitive, 
is it possible, given the costs of being world-class, that world-class status 
is not infi nitely valuable, affordable, or manageable? Can there be too 
many world-class universities just as there can be too few?
These are diffi cult questions. They become even more diffi cult when 
one asks whether world-class is a system concept or an institutional 
concept. At fi rst that may seem to be a question with only one answer: 
world-class is only an institutional concept. But a pause for refl ection 
will reveal that the question is not that simple. For example, although 
public universities have different degrees of autonomy, they all depend 
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on governments for fi nancial support, they have mandates that, at least 
to some extent, are set by the state, and they are parts of larger systems 
of higher education, some of which are highly centralized. Unless one 
were to disqualify all public universities from the world-class rank, being 
world-class must have a system dimension. Because in some jurisdictions 
there are large public subsidies to otherwise private universities, as in the 
case of many student fi nancial aid programs and research funding agencies, 
even some private universities are defi ned by public policy. If being world-
class is for some universities partly an expression of the performance of a 
system of higher education, diversity, logically, must be linked to quality.
Diversity among institutions or, at least, institutional types, is a policy 
objective that most systems of higher education pursue. At the same time 
those systems are also concerned about equity of access and the quality 
of educational opportunity. In highly differentiated systems, world-class 
is a deliberate part of diversity, as the existence of “fl agship” campuses in 
jurisdictions like California in the United States, of the grandes ecoles in 
France, and the 100 “world standard” universities in China (Lang and Zha, 
2004), demonstrate. In another time, “fl agship” and “world-class” might 
very well have meant the same thing.
Also in another time “reputation” and “quality” might have been taken 
to be synonyms. Research into “college choice” – that is, the factors that 
infl uence students’ decisions about the programs and institutions that they 
will apply to and attend – typically presents reputation and quality as 
separate factors in surveys and interviews of student choices (McDonogh 
1998, Clarke 2002, Lang and Lang 2002).  In the 1970s and 1980s, quality, 
expressed in different ways, usually ranked at the top as the most infl uential 
factor in students’ choices. Reputation usually ranked around the bottom 
of the fi rst quartile, and sometimes lower. In the 1990’s the pattern began 
to change; reputation rose and in some cases displaced quality as the 
most infl uential factor. This perhaps should not be surprising. We know 
that universities regularly engage in marketing and recruitment, and 
that “branding” is an institutional strategy for the purposes of attracting 
students and research funding. These strategies are not necessarily the 
desperate acts of universities that are far from the mark in terms of being 
world class. One has to look only as far as M.I.T. and Columbia in the 
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United States, Universitas 21 internationally, or Cambridge in England to 
fi nd top-ranked universities promoting their reputations as brand names 
for the purposes of marketing.
However the differences and similarities between reputation and quality 
are resolved, another disparity will remain. Are reputation and quality 
about education or research? The reward system for university faculty 
favours research. To the extent that journalistic rankings of universities 
are rewards to institutions, they too tend to favour research. In the case 
of both types of reward, there is no policy or deliberate intention to be 
lop-sided in favour of research. Nevertheless that is how the arithmetic 
of many league tables works, perhaps for no other reason than the broad 
availability of comparable data and the portability of measures of research 
across national boundaries  (Bok 2003, Altbach 2004). A recent ranking of 
the world’s top 500 universities is based entirely on measures of research 
performance (Liu 2004).
From the start, then, there is no logical reason to expect that there 
can be a single defi nition of “world-class.” Instead, the question has to be 
about the different parts or facets of what being world-class means. These 
components include quality, reputation, and context – that is, world-class 
as a concept within systems of higher education and as a concept that 
applied to universities independently. Finally, there is the implication that 
being world-class represents a trade-off with diversity, or at least a different 
view of public policies that promote diversity in higher education. 
Quality
It would be easy to say, simply, that there is no agreement about 
what quality means in higher education, or that, like art, quality is in 
the eye of the beholder. As a matter of fact, it’s true: there is no fi rm 
consensus internationally about what world-class quality is (Frazer 1994). 
“Internationally” is a key word in this context. It is not surprising to fi nd 
that individual jurisdictions have devised defi nitions and measurements 
of quality that suit their own institutions. But those defi nitions and 
measurements do not necessarily lend themselves to international or 
worldwide application. There are plausible reasons that explain why 
defi nitions of quality are often not internationally portable.
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First among these is audience: different stakeholders have different 
expectations about quality. Governments, as the principal fi nanciers and 
regulators of higher education, typically take what in the end amounts 
to a cost-benefi t view of quality in universities. This view also forces an 
ineluctable tendency to evaluate the performance of universities along 
with the performances of schools, hospitals, and social welfare. In other 
words, the basic idea of quality becomes a matter of proximate and optimal 
value instead of absolute value. It also becomes essentially comparative 
and relative.
Although governments purport to represent the interests of individual 
citizens, and therefore behave as if they held the proxies of all stakeholders 
in defi ning and appraising world-class quality, human capital theory 
explains why that representation is a political conceit. Moreover 
and more to the point, it is ironic. An argument is often advanced that 
markets, competition, and autonomy are the ingredients for world-class 
performance. That may or may not be so, but for the question at 
hand, there is enough confi rming scholarship, both anecdotal 
(Altbach 2004, MacTaggart 1998, El-Khawas and Massy 1996) 
and empirical (McLendon 2003, Clark 1998, Volkwein 1986) to suppose 
at least that it is. 
A fundamental precept in the economics of education is that 
investments, public and private, in higher education generate economic 
returns, also both public and private. That is what human capital theory is 
about. Governments act on that theory when they provide public subsidies 
to colleges and universities, and when they regulate tuition fees as private 
subsidies. Independent universities – either for-profi t or not-for-profi t – set 
tuition fees on the assumption that students as buyers will perceive that 
at least some economic value will arise from their investments. There is 
much wariness about higher education in the marketplace, but as long 
as there are private investments, one must assume that students, and in 
many cases their families, may have an interest in quality and world-class 
standing that is different from the interest of government. For example, 
because governments are the major fi nanciers of university research 
as well as universities generally, some of them have relatively little 
interest in separating education and research for the purpose of 
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defi ning quality. Some of them may in fact expect universities to rob the 
instructional Peter in order to pay the researcher Paul, which they often do. 
(Ehrenberg 2003).
Students on the other hand may have a very strong interest in making 
the separation. As Adam Smith said in The Wealth of Nations: “The 
discipline of colleges and universities is in general contrived, not for the 
benefi t of the students, but for the interest, or more properly speaking, for 
the ease of the masters.” (Smith 1937, III, II, 3) Smith would have good 
reason to say the same thing were he magically to be transported to the 21st 
century. As the cost of tuition rises, often on the belief that investments in 
higher education will generate returns far in excess of costs, students want 
to connect their investments to the quality of instruction. Governments 
and universities often promote higher education with explicit promises 
about returns on investment (Wolf 2002).
In some jurisdictions – Britain and Australia, for example  – governments 
are beginning to fi nance research and education separately. Within the 
context of this discussion, the most signifi cant aspects of these initiatives 
is that research is being assessed in terms of quality while undergraduate 
education is being assessed in terms of productivity, effi ciency, and 
added value. Quality, as an expression of world-class status, is becoming 
increasingly more about research than education (Altbach 2004).
Human capital theory also explains why employers, fi rst, have an 
interest in understanding what quality means in higher education and, 
second, have an interest that may be different from the interests of 
government and students. The general public may have an interest closely 
related to the interest of employers in the sense that defi nitions of quality 
– especially those that arise from accreditation – can serve as a sort of 
consumer protection or assurance about the qualifi cations of graduates.
There is a fi nal audience: universities themselves, particularly the 
professoriate, are concerned about defi nitions of quality. Indeed, they 
are the principal source of such defi nitions.  Within the context of world-
class quality, it is important to recall that the university as an instrument 
of the state is a relatively new concept. Scholarship, especially research, 
has a long and laudable history of portability among nations (Winchester 
1986). Perhaps the tendency to attach the quality of research (as opposed 
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to the quality of instruction) to world-class status should not be surprising. 
It may be a very old idea that is being recycled as it is in new research 
assessment procedures that have been recently introduced in Britain, the 
United States, Hong Kong, and Australia (El-Khawas and Massy 1996). 
These procedures rely heavily on the judgment of disciplinary peers as 
opposed, signifi cantly, to institutional or governmental agents. Moreover, 
these peers are often international. For example, the defi nition of what 
is “world-class” in university chemistry may be being determined by 
chemists, some of who may be employed by private R&D fi rms, without 
regard to organizational or jurisdictional boundaries.   
Because each of these audiences is different and has a different reason 
for being interested in quality in higher education, that there are different 
defi nitions of quality should not be surprising. Indeed, it is ineluctable. 
For a university or a government to pursue, as a matter of policy, world-
class status, that university or government must explicitly determine what 
its peer audiences are. It must also understand the factors and forces that 
cause colleges and universities to change, in this case in the direction of 
attaining world-class status.
Reputation
Aren’t quality and reputation the same? Perhaps they are not the same 
at all or, at least, not as alike as they might at fi rst seem. There are two sets 
of facts that elucidate what otherwise might seem to counter intuition.
First, in a study conducted at the University of Toronto (Lang and 
Lang 2002) of elite students who were applying to American and Canadian 
colleges and universities, over two-thirds of the students said that they 
took the diffi culty of being admitted as a surrogate for institutional quality. 
That assumption was especially pronounced – over 90 per cent – among 
the students who were applying to an American college or university. They 
indicated further that the admissions selection process was evidence of 
an intense competition for admission. An offer of admission to a highly 
selective university is coming to be viewed as a trophy with an inherent 
value of its own. One student who was interviewed made the point well: 
“They have to do that because they have so many applicants with high 
grades and high SATs that they have to fi nd other ways of picking students.” 
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That student was closer to the point than she might have realized. As the 
level of competition for admission intensifi es from what the Carnegie 
Council called “admissibility” to “selection” the process of selection shifts 
away from academic competence to personal characteristics and traits that 
“commend themselves for consideration” (Carnegie Council on Policy 
Studies in Higher Education, 1977).
Because of the rising cost of tuition, even at public colleges and 
universities, and because of reports from guidance counselors that good 
students sometimes make bad college choices, the College Choice Project 
at the University of Toronto also sought to determine the extent to which 
applicants drew distinctions between quality and reputation as factors in 
their choices of college and university. They did. Just over 70 per cent 
indicated that in terms of future job opportunities and of subsequent 
admission to graduate schools and professional schools, reputation might 
be more valuable than quality. In the survey component, where quality 
and reputation might have been regarded as different versions of the same 
query, a clear difference was perceived as each factor received different 
scores. Quality ranked higher – just under 90 per of all respondents 
“strongly agreed” – than reputation as just under 80 per cent “strongly 
agreed” that it was a factor in their college choice.
 Compared to other post-admission surveys (Astin, 1993; Acumen, 
1998, 1999) the relatively high ranking of reputation is signifi cant. 
Parents, in that part of the College Choice project, ranked reputation 
higher than quality. This was true of virtually all parents of students who 
were applying to American colleges and universities. These results are 
similar to those found in an American study of students in Ivy League 
colleges and universities who were asked to rank the factors that 
infl uenced their college choices. “Prestige and name recognition” 
ranked fi rst, slightly but nevertheless signifi cantly ahead of “academic 
program” (Greene 1998). In the College Choice Project, this was the area 
in which the views of guidance counselors most differed from the views 
of students. Counselors tried to discourage students from selecting 
colleges and universities on the basis of their reputations instead of 
the quality and suitability of their programs; the majority of students 
discounted that advice.
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Second, the arithmetic mechanics of major surveys of nominal 
quality do not regard reputation as a synonym for quality. The major 
American survey is conducted annually by U.S. News & World Report. 
The counterpart of the U.S. News & World Report survey in Canada is 
conducted by Maclean’s magazine. In both of these surveys reputation is 
one factor among many, and in neither case is a major factor. Reputation 
comprises no more than 20 per cent of the Maclean’s survey and 25 per 
cent of the U.S. News & World Report survey (Morse and Flanagan 2002). 
Thus while there is some overlap between quality and reputation it is 
relatively minor.
The sources of the information that U.S. News & World Report and 
Maclean’s collect about reputation also indicate a difference between 
quality and reputation. The Maclean’s survey bases its measure of reputation 
on rates of fi nancial support from alumni, and on a poll of corporate 
chief executives, secondary school guidance counselors, and university 
administrators. Of these three, the third group is the only one that could 
provide credible information about quality. The other two groups may 
know something about reputation, but are unlikely to be reliable judges 
of quality. U.S. News & World Report surveys only college and university 
presidents and deans of admission. Neither survey polls professors and 
researchers (unless they hold administrative positions in addition to their 
academic positions).
There is some reason to believe that even the university administrators’ 
perceptions of quality may be in the fi rst instance reputational when 
applied to institutions other than the ones by which they are employed 
and therefore directly familiar (Webster 1992). What this boils down to 
is relatively simple: the statistical structure of commercial rankings of 
universities inherently separates quality and reputation.
In 2004 Gary Pike conducted a comparative analysis of the U.S. News 
& World Report survey and the [American] National Survey of Student 
Engagement (NSSE) which measured the involvement of students in 
activities that contribute to academic performance. Pike’s fi rst and 
strongest conclusion was that “the quality of a student’s education is not 
synonymous with the resources and reputation of an institution.” (p. 204) 
This conclusion is the quantitative counterpart of the qualitative reports 
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from the College Choice Project about the efforts of guidance counselors 
to persuade students defi ne quality apart from reputation (Lang and Lang 
2002)  
Because rankings of colleges and universities are usually constructed 
by for-profi t press media, the fact that they are commercially successful 
indicates that there is a market for information about reputation. The 
results of the College Choice Project at the University of Toronto explain 
the origin of that market: students want to know about reputation and they 
do not necessarily equate quality with reputation Does this make sense? 
It does to economists. (Lang and Lang 2002)
Human Capital Theory and Signaling
Benjamin Franklin said “If a man empties his purse into his head, no 
man can take it away from him. An investment in education pays the best 
dividends.” Poor Richard, Franklin’s nom de plume, would have called that 
common sense. Today economists call it the theory of human capital. It is a 
powerful theory that simultaneously explains large-scale public subsidies 
to colleges and universities and high tuition fees at private colleges and 
universities. 
The idea is not complex: human intelligence and skill can produce 
wealth just as land and machines – that is, conventional capital – produce 
wealth. Education adds to the value of human capital and, in turn, generates 
public monetary returns in the form of higher productivity and economic 
growth. It also generates private monetary returns in the form of higher 
earnings. 
There is a causal relationship between the quality of education 
and human capital theory: greater quality logically ought to produce 
an expansion of human capital and, in turn, higher returns, both public 
and private. Why then would there be a differentiation between quality 
and reputation? The answer is another economic theory usually called 
“signaling” but sometimes also called “screening.” Here the idea is still 
based on human capital, but postulates that many of the human qualities 
that create wealth – intelligence, industry, initiative, and innovation, 
for example – are innate, and that formal education adds little to their 
productive value (Berg 1971). According to signaling or screening theory, 
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what colleges and universities do is rank or sort students in terms of their 
innate qualities (Rubenstein 1998) thus indicating to employers which 
students present the most human capital, much of which they possessed 
prior to becoming post-secondary students. In other words and with regard 
to a previous point, offers of admission can alone really be economically 
valuable trophies.
The screening function does not add to human capital. It is not an 
expression of educational or institutional quality. It is an expression of 
student quality that uses the language of institutional reputation. This 
is why, if we return to the arithmetic of league rankings, the U.S. News 
& World Report and Maclean’s surveys assign high weights to the high 
school grades and standardized test scores of entering students. This is why 
students ignore the advice of guidance counselors to choose universities on 
the basis of quality instead of reputation. This is why alumni of universities 
are among the most frequent purchasers of the U.S. News & World Report 
and Maclean’s surveys. This is also why Money, which is another magazine 
that ranks American colleges and universities, openly says that its survey 
is not about quality; it is about value for money (Webster 1992). The U.S. 
News & World Report and Maclean’s surveys both now include sub-tables 
that purport to measure added value and “best buys.”
The signaling function presents a number of contradictions in the 
ranking of colleges and universities. First, as just explained, the market 
signals for higher education are in the fi rst instance about reputation, 
and only coincidentally about quality. But through a combination of 
funding policies based on human capital theory and neo-liberal global 
economics, higher education has been marketized, particularly among 
research-intensive universities (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, Ehrenberg 
2003). This leads to the second contradiction: for the higher education 
market to work, students and governments as purchasers need to know 
more than they do about the quality of the colleges and universities in 
which they invest. Publications like U.S. News & World Report, Money, 
and Maclean’s, whatever their failings, are de facto measures to fi ll a gap 
in information that the market needs to function properly (Webster 1992, 
McDonogh 1997). In some jurisdictions –Ontario, Canada, for example 
– governments have deployed “key performance indicators” in an attempt 
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to correct market imperfections by injecting additional and standardized 
information for students as consumers.
This gap is a serious problem for any attempts to appraise the quality 
of a college or university on the basis of student selectivity (which in some 
cases accounts for as much as 40 per cent of non-reputational rankings). 
When Michael Spence was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2001, he was asked 
by a journalist “whether it was true that you could be awarded the Nobel 
Prize in Economics for simply noticing that there are markets in which 
certain participants don’t know certain things that others in the market 
do know?” (Spence 2001). The answer, of course, was yes: the degree 
of aysmmetry, as Spence used the term, was, if not simple, surprising. In 
economic terms, the market for higher education is highly asymmetrical. 
This is exemplifi ed by the research on college choice that reveals the 
erroneous but forceful perceptions that applicants have about the selection 
process (Lang and Lang 2002).  
Governments also are buyers in the higher education market, or perhaps 
in two higher education markets. To the extent that governments provide 
subsidies to colleges and universities in order to increase productivity and 
stimulate economic growth, they are making investments or purchases 
from which they expect certain returns. In these cases the purchase is of 
education, or in economic terms, increased human capital. Governments 
thus are interested in quality even if students and their parents are interested 
in reputation. 
In other cases, the government is the principal in a principal-agent 
relationship for the acquisition of research. It is a particularly diffi cult 
principal-agent relationship because, almost by defi nition, the principal as 
buyer cannot know at the time of purchase the outcome of the research that 
the agent – a university researcher – will undertake. In other words, the 
market for university research is ineluctably and inherently asymmetrical. 
Discussing university research in these terms may seem crass, but it 
explains why reputation is often a surrogate for quality. For example, the 
ranking of the world’s top 100 universities constructed by the Institute 
for Higher Education at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (Liu 2004) is 
based entirely on measures of research performance, and every measure 
is essentially an historical track record. In some cases the record extends 
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as far back as 1911 and 1981. In the higher education research market, 
in terms of the information available to the funding agency as purchaser, 
virtually the only information available is about reputation.
This poses a third contradiction. Let us assume that reputation is 
an acceptable surrogate for quality, and that the various institutional 
measurements and rankings based on reputation are accurate. Of course 
these assumptions are questionable but that is not the point. The point, 
instead, is more profound and potentially troubling. If rankings of world-
class standing constructed in this way are taken seriously, for example, by 
allocating funding according to rank or by setting tuition fees on the basis 
of rank, they may impede the creation of knowledge by reinforcing obsolete 
reputational paradigms and homogenizing scholarship. In that case, 
winning the race to be number one may in the end be an accomplishment 
of Pyrrhic proportion. 
Quality by Comparison
However world class quality is defi ned, it is inevitably a comparative 
concept. Colleges and universities throughout much of the world are 
regularly compared to one another. Sometimes they do this by their 
own choice, usually either to benchmark their costs and performance 
or to determine their competitive market positions. At other times they 
are compared and ranked by the press, a practice that most colleges and 
universities on the one hand, decry, and, on the other hand, cannot resist 
(Just 2002). 
At yet other times, usually in the name of accountability, governments 
whose systems of higher education are centralized compare colleges and 
universities, at least those within their own systems. Sometimes the systems 
themselves are compared, in which case quality often is not the primary 
index. Often the degree of diversity within each system becomes a point 
of comparison, usually with respect to questions about how differentiation 
among institutions might be measured and promoted, and how distinctive 
institutional missions and roles might be recognized within each system.  
Measuring quality and diversity is not easy. This is not only a matter 
of objective quantifi cation and comparison. It also has a lot to do with how 
universities change in order to become world-class or more diverse. What 
02 Lang 27-55 FINAL.indd   39 2/8/2006   10:44:18 AM
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education
Volume XXXV, No. 3, 2005
40 D.W. Lang
is the fundamental cause of change in higher education? What events and 
conditions might cause a university to become world class? This is not a 
matter of simple instrumentalism. For example, as Pike’s research (2004) 
and Volkwein’s earlier research (Volkwein 1989) demonstrate, infusions of 
resources do not necessarily improve or signify quality in higher education. 
In turn, neither is it necessarily possible for a university to spend its way 
to world-class status.
Robert Birnbaum, who has written extensively about diversity in higher 
education identifi ed at least six different kinds of diversity and two different 
paradigms – “natural selection” and “resource dependence” (Birnbaum 
1983). He and others further observed that none of the conventional, 
broadly applied institutional classifi cation schemes – including some of 
those that purport to identify “world-class” – satisfactorily accounts for all 
institutional characteristics, including quality (Birnbaum 1983).
There are other paradigms. Joseph Ben-David (1972) argued that 
universities change is response to competition, and that competition 
is greatest when colleges and universities are relatively independent. 
Altbach (2004), Clark (1998), and MacTaggart (1998) later advanced 
similar cases for institutional autonomy cum competition. This would 
imply a paradigm rooted in organizational behaviour and system structure. 
From this follows an intriguing paradox: as governments pursue quality 
through the construction of more highly regulated and planned systems of 
higher education they may in practical fact be creating environments that 
discourage quality by over-generalizing about it.
This in turn suggests another question: Is it quality and diversity 
in terms of world class that should be measured or is it the conditions 
that engender world class standing, in this case the level of regulation, 
including accreditation, which should be measured? Since regulation is 
an almost exclusively system concept, and since institutional change and 
differentiation is a continuous process (Blau 1994), comparisons based 
on individual institutions, regardless of how they are classifi ed, might be 
a step away from the real issue. Assuming that there is an agreement on 
what being world-class means, and that there is a reliable methodology for 
determining when a university has reached world class status, an important 
question remains about what that university must do to retain its status. 
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Peter Blau, in The Organization of Academic Work, a title that itself 
suggests a theory about the foundations of world-class standing, advanced 
a paradigm based on social forces, institutional size and the proportionate 
scale of administration. According to Blau (1994), these factors operate in 
more or less the same way regardless of institutional type. An implication 
is that the classifi cation of institutions by group is not a reliable measure 
of world class standing. 
“World-class” thus can have a system meaning, an institutional 
meaning, and a disciplinary meaning. Also, world-class standing is, in 
system terms, a form of diversity to which only some institutions either 
can or should aspire (Altbach 2004).
Quality, Reputation, and the Selection of Peers
Just as guilt by association is a specious proposition, so is being world-
class by association. Defi ning world class standing by association is reliable 
only when there is an objective and systematic means of determining peers 
for the purpose of comparison and ranking. Peer selection as a policy issue 
began to grow in importance as interest in accountability and performance 
indicators grew, and as colleges and universities came under greater pressure 
to perform effi ciently. In order to make informed decisions about strategy 
and resource allocations individual institutions might quite legitimately 
wish to construct comparisons with other institutions for the purposes of 
benchmarking. Benchmarking is not necessarily about quality. More often 
it is about the effi cient use of resources, usually in monetary terms, but not 
always. For example, the utilization of space is often benchmarked.  
There are many different indicators of performance, and almost as 
many debates about their reliability, relevance, and fundamental purposes. 
Nevertheless, most public systems of higher education are committed to 
them (Lang 2005). As well and more to the point, any attempt to assign 
world-class status on the basis of performance indicators is inherently 
comparative.   
Comparisons made ad hoc, either because data are readily available 
or because comparisons with certain other institutions produce intuitively 
desirable results, are inherently unreliable.  Convenience and politically 
useful results should not form the basis of peer selection. Nor can the 
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quality and performance of individual colleges and universities or systems 
of higher education be effectively appraised by anecdote. Yet, in the absence 
of systematic means of determining peers, that is an entirely possible and 
unfortunately misleading result. 
There are many legitimate criticisms of schemes that rank colleges 
and universities. At the same time, as Michael Spence (2001) might say, 
there is a need for more information about the performance of colleges 
and universities so that the “buyers” in the higher educational marketplace 
know as much as the “sellers.” Most critics of ranking focus on its statistical 
methodology and the legitimacy of the various factors that are used to 
express institutional performance.  However, even if those defi ciencies 
were corrected, a major problem would remain. Unless one presumes 
that every university has the same mission, and that every university has 
the same access to resources, inter-institutional comparisons – especially 
international comparisons – can fail. There are two methodologies in the 
foundation on which ranking schemes should be built. The fi rst comprises 
the weights, indices, and defi nitions that measure and express institutional 
performance. The second comprises the ways and means of selecting peers 
for the purpose of comparison. The fi rst methodology has received a lot of 
scholarly attention. The second has not (Lang 2000). 
Peer selection is as much an art as a science, and fundamentally involves 
professional judgment. The ultimate objective of any methodology for 
determining peers for comparison should be to ensure that the institutions 
are suffi ciently similar for comparisons to make sense.  Institutions have 
different roles, some deliberately set as mission statements while other roles 
are the products of history; others still are the unfortunate consequence of 
institutional drift.  Institutions are different in terms of size and location. 
They are different in terms of organizational complexity, which is not 
necessarily determined by size. 
These differences are more than technicalities. If rankings of world 
class standing were more complex and, particularly, balanced instruction 
and research, graduate and undergraduate education, and reputation 
and quality, what otherwise might seem to be minor differences among 
institutions would indeed be minor. The problem is that no national or 
international ranking scheme does that. The U.S. News & World Report 
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and Maclean’s surveys try to solve part of the problem by placing different 
types of institutions in different categories. Not all of those types are 
internationally portable. A notable example are the elite American liberal 
arts colleges like Amherst and Swarthmore that, as an institutional type, 
do not exist outside the United States but whose quality and reputation 
for undergraduate education often exceed those of their of Ivy League 
competitors. In terms of resources on a per student basis – which is 
frequently taken as a measure of quality – they rank even further ahead. 
What this example suggests is that the word “class” in world class should 
have two meanings, with the second meaning denoting a generic type 
of institution. This example also suggests, as recent research indicates 
(Marsh and Hattie 2002), that the quality of instruction and the quality of 
research are not so causally linked that any ranking of world-class status 
must incorporate both.
Furthermore, Blau’s paradigm of institutional change, like Diana 
Crane’s (1972) work on Invisible Colleges, suggests that, in terms of 
the institutional behaviours that lead to world class-ness, fundamental 
academic change occurs in the fi rst instance within disciplines and fi elds 
of knowledge. It is only secondarily organizational or structural. The logic 
of this paradigm is that while there might be comparatively defi ned world-
class departments of, for example, chemistry, comparative defi nitions of 
world-class institutions are problematic. This paradigm may also explain 
the trend to express quality as a measure of research performance instead 
of educational performance. Categorization thus may not be a solution to 
the problem that diversity poses for inter-institutional comparisons and 
rankings.
Comparisons Based on Resources
What difference do resources make in defi ning quality? Economists of 
education draw an important distinction between tax effort and tax capacity. 
What they are trying to get at are differences in the resources available to 
schools, colleges, and universities in jurisdictions that otherwise seem to 
be comparable. Resources or “inputs” are major factors in most algorithms 
for ranking colleges and universities. Spending per student, for example, 
is a measurement of quality based on resources.
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Tax capacity is essentially about wealth. But the presence of wealth, 
however measured, can neither assure nor signify quality. There are 
two reasons for this. First, a jurisdiction may decide to direct its wealth 
elsewhere, for example to health care. There are rankings of the “best 
hospitals” just as there are rankings of the “best universities.” The second 
reason is expressed as tax effort: the extent to which a jurisdiction chooses 
to tax the wealth available to it.  
There might be a tendency to see tax capacity and tax effort as factors 
that affect only public universities. They affect private universities too. 
Tax capacity is in the fi rst instance about private wealth, that is, wealth that 
can be taxed. That is the same wealth that can also be directed to tuition 
fees, philanthropy, and industrial research. Publicly-funded or guaranteed 
student fi nancial aid provides what amounts to the working capital of many 
private colleges and universities.
To the extent that private wealth in the form of tuition fees is part 
of comparisons and rankings based on resources, rates of private 
return on private investments – that is, the tuition fee and foregone 
income – are important. Each year the OECD reports national rates of 
return on private investments in higher education. Those reports continually 
show large differences from country to country. The differences are so 
large – sometimes by factors as high as 2:1 – that they can affect the degree 
of private wealth directed to higher education.
Taking tax effort and tax capacity into account will not necessarily 
defi ne quality. In fact, it probably will not. It will, however, advise policy 
about the prudence and practicality of making investments in order to 
secure world-class standing. As Philip Altbach (2004) pointed out, being 
world-class might not be affordable. It also will have a relational value. 
The U.S. News & World Report survey, the Maclean’s survey, and the 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University ranking (Liu 2004) all deploy a highly 
questionable bit of statistical sleight-of-hand. They each assign a value 
of 100 to the highest-ranking institution in their respective survey. Thus 
the least imperfect institution becomes the perfect institution. This is done 
to make the differences among the institutions seem larger and thereby 
more signifi cant. In terms of tax capacity and especially tax effort, this 
statistical exaggeration can overstate the putative cost of moving upward 
on the world-class scale.
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Even if the cost of moving upward in a ranking of world-class 
universities were affordable, two problems might remain. The fi rst 
highlights the conundrum that difference between reputation and quality 
causes. Without the statistical infl ation of the distance between institutions 
in ranked order, some institutions may be so close to one another in terms 
of quality that any investment made to raise an institution’s rank would be 
unwise because the returns would be negligible. The end would not justify 
the means. A tie would be as good as a win.
The same, however, cannot be said about reputation. Even if 
statistically unwarranted or even invalid, an upward or downward 
movement in reputational rank can make a major difference, for example, 
in the ability to recruit students and faculty. In terms of the screening or 
signaling function, it can make a difference in the earnings of graduates, 
which is why alumni continue to be interested in rankings long after the 
actual quality of their alma maters could possibly make a difference to 
their employment prospects.
The second problem is that rankings can be manipulated in ways that 
have no relationship at all to investments as costs or as means of improving 
quality. James Fallows (2001), in a recent analysis of the emphasis 
placed by elite American universities on early admission, gave the 
example of the University of Pennsylvania, which was, it appeared, losing 
its reputation and ability to attract students because of its low placement 
on various league tables. Through a variety of measures Penn pulled 
itself up to sixth place in the U.S. News & World Report survey. What 
really happened? One way that a college or university can make itself look 
more competitive for the purposes of national rankings is to admit more 
students under early admission. This is a relatively simple matter of 
arithmetic. For every place in the freshman class that is fi lled by early 
admission the ratio of applicant to place is 1:1 and the yield rate is 100 
per cent. If, for example, half the class is fi lled in that way, the number 
of places to be fi lled through regular admission, which is what most 
applicants apply for, goes down by 50 per cent. This tactic drives up the 
remaining applicant per place ratio and thus increases the overall yield 
rate as the 100 per cent rate for early admission is blended with the lower 
rate – sometimes as low as 40 per cent even for elite institutions (Geiger 
2000) – for regular admission.  Thus the University of Pennsylvania 
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improved its reputation without making any signifi cant change in its 
quality or making any major new investments in resources.
Systems versus Institutions in Comparisons.
An obvious although frequently overlooked matter of fact in ranking 
and comparing universities is that institutions are not systems, and vice 
versa. Institutions often have certain characteristics because of the systems 
of which they are a part. Even institutions that are afforded high degrees 
of autonomy sometimes are defi ned in certain respects by the public 
jurisdictions in which they are located. Absolute autonomy from the state 
is not feasible (McLendon 2003) and ranking schemes cannot presume 
that it is.
To a smaller degree, political jurisdictions can affect the performance 
of private universities, for example, by regulating competition or by 
controlling access to publicly-funded or guaranteed fi nancial aid. 
Accreditation is most often found in mixed or predominantly private 
jurisdictions. Accreditation is, fi rst, much more a national concept than 
an international concept, the current round of World Trade Organization 
GATS negotiations notwithstanding. Second, accreditation is about 
standardization instead of differentiation. Third, it is about minimum 
standards. It is higher education’s version of consumer protection. None of 
this means that accreditation is useless. But it does mean that accreditation 
can get in the way of aspirations to be world-class. It also means that, while 
accreditation can advance the identifi cation of peer institutions within a 
nation or region, it impedes such identifi cation internationally. 
What this suggests is that for any university to be considered even 
a candidate for world class standing it should have a high degree of 
autonomy. This not hortatory. It makes a practical difference. This can be 
exemplifi ed by a contrast of the results of two research projects. In 1997 
the Commonwealth Higher Education Management Service surveyed 70 
universities world-wide in an effort to measure the degree to which they 
were affected by state control (Richardson and Fielden 1997). Institutional 
autonomy and academic freedom were defi ned and scored separately. In 
2003 the Institute of Higher Education at Shanghai Jiao Tong University 
constructed a ranking of the world’s top 500 universities (Liu 2004). 
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In the Commonwealth Higher Education Management Service study, the 
region with the lowest state control score for institutional autonomy was 
North America at 13 per cent. Asia was the highest at 42 per cent. In the 
Shanghai Jiao Tong study, 63 per cent of the top 500 universities were 
North American and fi ve per cent were Asian. This does not mean that 
universities with less independence cannot be of high quality. It, however, 
does mean that they are not suitable as peers for the purposes of worldwide 
comparison.
What, for the purposes of selecting peers for comparison, are the 
hallmarks of autonomy? Burton Clark (1998), Terrence MacTaggart (1998), 
and Philip Altbach (2004) all present convincing evidence that a high 
degree of internal self-governance is essential to high performance. When 
Clark Kerr was chancellor if the University of California at Berkeley he 
made a point of studying Berkeley’s competitors to determine what made 
them successful. Harvard, Berkeley’s major competitor at the time, was 
notable because “ ... as the nation’s oldest university, it was the newest in 
responding the most quickly to out-front developments in the intellectual 
world” (Kerr 1991, p. 12) Harvard could move quickly because it was 
self-governing and not burdened by red tape. A decade later Burton Clark 
observed that quick, nimble internal decision-making was a characteristic 
shared by successful entrepreneurial universities (Clark 1998). 
Self-governance should not be the result of occasional or ad hoc 
policies, no matter how well-intended. Self-governance should be assured 
by legislation, as should academic freedom. Academic freedom, as a 
criterion for world-class standing, is not only a political concept. Religious 
orthodoxy can have the same effects on institutional performance and 
quality as highly centralized public systems have.
The form of funding – as distinct from the amount of funding – is another 
telltale sign of the degree of institutional autonomy necessary for selecting 
peers for world class comparisons. Funding formulas, which are in place in 
many public systems of higher education, often have powerful standardizing 
effects. That often is an express purpose of funding formulas (Lang 
2005). Nor do they encourage quality and innovation (Ehrenberg 2003). 
Notably, these are criticisms that are often advanced towards league tables 
(Kerr 1991; Webster 1992) and accreditation (Skolnik 1986, Ewell 1991).
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World-Class or the Curse of Comparison?
To say that the answer to this question is “both” might seem to be 
an equivocation. It is not. A world class ranking of educational quality is 
impossible because there are too many permutations and combinations, 
mandates, and limits imposed by funding to make a reliable selection 
of peers for comparison possible. To persist in ranking universities 
internationally in terms of overall quality – that is, attempting to identify 
the “ world’s best universities” – is not only an exercise in the production 
of mis-information, it also is an exercise that will defeat diversity and 
accessibility. Ultimately, despite the pious claims of U.S. News & World 
Report, Maclean’s, Money, and the THES,  it will lead to lower quality.
It is, however, possible, if only proximately, to identify slates of 
peer universities for the purpose of making international comparisons 
of research quality and productivity (Lang 2000). Comparisons based 
on research “self defi nes” an institutional type: the research-intensive 
university. That defi nition shortens the list of contending institutions 
and results in enough conformity to make reliable selections of peers. To 
understand how this can work we have fi rst to recognize that much of the 
complexity of developing measures of research quality and productivity 
can explained by the economic concept of principal and agent. This is 
usually called the agency problem.
With a few exceptions, principals fund research but do not conduct 
it themselves.  Instead, they purchase research from agents who may be 
seen as either individual researchers in universities, or as the universities 
themselves. Therein lies one major complexity.  In theory, in terms of 
the agency relationship, it is the productivity of the agent that should be 
measured. This suggests that, of the several paradigms that might explain 
institutional behavioiur in the direction of world class standing, Blau’s 
(1994) is the most plausible: quality is mainly about the performance of 
faculty.
Funding agencies as principals have different motives and expectations 
than do researchers as agents. It is diffi cult, if not impossible, for the 
sponsors of research to know and, more to the point, evaluate the actual 
processes of research. But to a considerable degree it is those processes that 
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productivity is about. Experts who think a lot about agency relationships 
recommend contractual arrangements that are based on outcomes (instead 
of process). To the extent that major rankings of universities incorporate 
performance in research, they measure and rank outcomes. “To the extent” 
is an important qualifi er: the extent often is not great.
Consider this. Each of the two most frequently referred to lists of 
strategic indicators for higher education in the United States comprises 
over 100 indicators.  On one of the lists (Taylor et al. 1993) research appears 
only once.  On the other (Taylor and Massy, 1996), research appears twice. 
Both lists contain a “top ten” of indicators.  Research appears on neither. 
Not one of the indicators that involve research could be construed as 
having anything to do with quality or productivity. 
The situation in Canada is not much different. In Ontario the Minster’s 
Task Force on University Accountability (1993) devised 25 indicators of 
university performance, of which only fi ve involve research. Fourteen of 
the 25 indicators were identifi ed as “core indicators”.  Only two of the 
core indicators involve research. Maclean’s magazine, in constructing its 
annual ranking of universities, deploys about 20 indicators of which only 
three involve research directly, and two more involve research partially. In 
Alberta the provincial government uses a series of indicators to allocate 
a portion of its annual operating grants to colleges and universities. Only 
eight indicators drawn from a possible list of 83 involve research.  
In the U.S. News & World Report rankings, the weights assigned 
to research activity – measured in terms of expenditures on research – 
ranges from zero in the rankings of colleges and business schools to 30 
per cent for medical schools. The average is 15 per cent. That the basis 
of measurement is expense perhaps should not be surprising. As Roger 
Noll and William Rogerson (1998) observed in Challenges to Research 
Universities, “[A]bout the only aspect of a research program that can be 
measured objectively is the university’s expenditures on inputs.” (p. 109) 
To see the truth in that observation one has only to look at the terms of a 
typical research grant or research contract. It will be almost exclusively 
about inputs; little will be said about outputs.  
That sounds simple and straightforward until one considers that the 
process of conducting research is poorly suited to the normal understanding 
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of the principal – agent relationship.  Principals, as the funders of research, 
normally think in terms of outputs.  The means by which the outputs are 
created are essentially unimportant to the principal.  To the academic agent 
as researcher, this is on the one hand welcome and on the other hand a 
problem.  It is welcome because it discourages the principal as funder 
from interfering with the process of scholarship.  Ends count, means do 
not.  This is important to institutional autonomy as an essential criterion 
for inclusion in rankings of world class standing.
The problem insofar as selecting peers and constructing league 
rankings is that research is not the only thing that university faculty do. 
At the University of Toronto, for example, research should, as a rule of 
thumb, occupy about 40 per cent of a faculty member’s time. That is a 
comparatively high proportion. In North American universities at large the 
percentage is closer to 30 per cent (Middaugh 1999). So more than one-half 
of a university professor’s time, at least nominally, is not spent conducting 
research. Indicators of “faculty quality” therefore are not necessarily the 
same as indicators of “research quality.” Again, the quality of research 
cannot serve as a surrogate for wider quality. 
CONCLUSION
If we assume that for some reason one wants to construct, literally, 
a reliable serial worldwide ranking of universities, the only possible ranking 
will be a comparative display of research performance only. In this case, 
the number of universities that can be compared will be relatively small. 
However, even a ranking based exclusively on research will be problematic 
for at least three reasons.
First, most existing surveys and rankings place a relatively low 
weight on research. Second, there are relatively few indices of research 
performance. Third, different levels and forms of funding for research 
exist among jurisdictions as well as among disciplines. The heavy reliance 
in the Carnegie classifi cation scheme on funding from U.S. federal sources 
explains, for example, why that taxonomy is largely confi ned to the U.S. 
There are as well major differences in the amounts of funding available for 
different research sectors. In some jurisdictions, for example, more than 50 
per cent of all public funding for research is earmarked for health science. 
02 Lang 27-55 FINAL.indd   50 2/8/2006   10:44:19 AM
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education
Volume XXXV, No. 3, 2005
 “World Class” or The Curse of Comparison? 51
Thus the nominal performance of a university with health science faculties 
will appear to be better than the research performance of a university 
whose research focus is elsewhere.
Reliable serial ranking of overall educational quality is not possible. 
The concept of “world-class” compounds the fl aws and inadequacies of 
existing national rankings. If reliable national rankings are not possible, the 
prospect of a reliable ranking of world-class is even more remote. There 
are too many different mandates and audiences for universities for a single 
scale of measurement to produce valid or useful results. Finally, there is no 
credible or convincing evidence that establishes research performance as 
an acceptable surrogate for educational performance. So, even if a reliable 
serial ranking of research performance is constructed, it cannot serve a 
broader purpose.
While ideally reputation and quality ought to be the same, they are 
not. Nor are they perceived to be, particularly by students and parents. 
Reputation, in the form of market branding, is displacing quality as the 
factor that most infl uences student choice of university. In that context, 
both reputation and quality pertain to undergraduate instruction and the 
services that support it. Thus, just as research performance cannot serve as 
a surrogate for overall educational performance, educational performance 
cannot serve as a surrogate for research performance. 
Current methodologies – whether commercial or academic – for 
ranking universities internationally tend inherently toward isomorphism. 
The American research university is the predominant model. In economic 
terms, this could be called “look alike” competition. Such competition 
might be successful in market terms, but in academic terms it works against 
change and the production of new knowledge. The greatest danger in a 
ranking of world-class status is not that it would be inaccurate (although it 
would be), but that it would freeze institutional performance in a monolithic 
present. This is the curse of comparison. Although there are differences 
of opinion about the dependence of developing universities on Western 
models, the isomorphic nature of rankings of world class reinforces that 
dependence.
Finally, the key to reliable comparisons of universities is the 
development and use of objective and systematic selections of peer 
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institutions. Two points must be emphasized to ensure understanding of 
this conclusion. The fi rst is that a ranking of peers is not about quality or 
performance. Instead, it is about the degree of difference or similarity among 
institutions. Once an acceptable degree of similarity has been determined, 
reliable comparison – particularly for benchmarking – becomes possible. 
But while this might sound like a conventional ranking, it involves much 
shorter lists, perhaps no more than ten or fi fteen institutions once program, 
tax wealth, and cost of living are taken fully into account. Program mix is 
especially important because so many institutional costs and opportunities 
for research funding are based on the particular array of programs within 
each university. 
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